Abstract This article explores three questions. First, it considers who does and should determine the demand for probation services; second, why the pattern for the demand and supply of probation services is as it currently is; and finally, it considers how the future demand and supply of probation services might be altered. The author argues that the 'silting up' of probation caseloads with low risk offenders is a major problem for an already over-stretched workforce and suggests a number of measures which could be taken to address this problem -these include the 'up-tariffing' of community service, more use of restorative justice approaches, a more effective strategy to inform sentencers of the effects their sentencing decisions are having, and a return to a greater reliance on financial penalties.
I discovered my fellow syndicate members were willing, temporarily to set terminological and philosophical issues aside. The question which the management consultant clearly wished us to consider was: who does the probation service principally have to satisfy in order that its services continue to be demanded? And I had very little doubt about the answer to that question, though I anticipated we might have a debate choosing between two principal candidates -sentencers and ministers. To my surprise, however, I discovered that virtually no one in my syndicate initially agreed with my view. Animated discussion ensued. We never got around to talking about the skills and behaviours that needed to be encouraged. And we barely touched on the 'critical success factors'. We spent all our time debating the first question -identifying the core customers. Further, when we reported back to the plenary session other syndicates announced conclusions different to ours: the public at large, offenders, victims, local communities, even community service beneficiaries, as well as sentencers and ministers were mentioned.
I have since reflected on this experience. On one level I have speculated that the lack of agreement reflected the terminological confusion. The fact that inappropriate commercial language was being used -customers buying products in a market place -meant that, in order not to appear spoilsports on the day, the audience was prepared to substitute 'customer' for 'stakeholder', 'beneficiary', 'consumer', 'client', etc. and, as a consequence, came up with very different results. However, I also concluded that this reasoning doesn't entirely wash. I think this banal and in some senses misguided management exercise exposed seriously woolly thinking within the probation service which, if perpetuated, prejudices its future operation. Let me explain.
The public
Let us abandon the term customer and think of users instead. There are, as far as I am aware, no ordinary members of the public contemplating whether they should use a service delivered by the probation service. This places the probation service in a very different relationship to the public at large from, for example, the police. Most of us do decide whether to use the police, and we do so relatively frequently. If we are victimized we decide whether to call the police and report the crime event to them. If we observe an offence, we decide whether to offer ourselves as witnesses. If we are asked by the police to assist them with information, we decide whether to co-operate. We are the direct recipients of police services, about which we are more or less satisfied. The same applies to the health service, education, and so on. By contrast, ordinary members of the public are not users of the correctional services -probation and prisons. They benefit from them, or rather it is to be hoped that they do. They are hopefully better protected from being revictimized. In this sense the public are the beneficiaries of the probation service in much the same way as they are of the civil aviation authority -whose services, exercised on behalf of the state, presumably reduce the likelihood of aeroplanes colliding and falling out of the sky. It is obviously desirable that we all have confidence in agencies like the CAA and the probation service. If we have, this makes the task of those who fund and deal directly with them that much easier. But we are emphatically not the users, let alone the customers, of these agencies. Most citizens, I confidently predict, do not know much about the workings of the CAA and the evidence suggests they know very little about the probation service. There is no reason why they should. Furthermore, there is little prospect, whatever the probation service does, that levels of public knowledge about it will greatly increase. The probation service is part of the background fabric of the state.
Offenders and victims
Offenders, by contrast, deal directly with the probation service -about 200,000 of them at any one time (National Probation Service, 2001, p. iii) . Offenders form a clear, informed view about the quality of probation staff and services. But offenders can scarcely be considered the customers of the probation service. It is not they who decide whether or not to have contact. Others do that for them. Offenders are instructed to comply. They constitute the material on which the service works. If the probation service can be said to have a product, it is 'changed' or 'controlled' offenders which is why, in the absence of incontrovertible evidence as to outcomes, the National Probation Directorate (NPD) is beginning to refer to programmes which hold out the promise of changed or controlled offenders as products.
What of crime victims? They are increasingly being brought within the fold of criminal justice decision-making as a result of the Victims Charter and statutory provisions involving them in decision-making. These victims might be regarded as users or customers, but the number involved remains small and they can scarcely be considered the probation service's core users.
Which leaves us, I suggest, with only two candidates meriting serious consideration as 'core customers'. First, Home Office ministers and the senior civil servants, who convert ministerial wishes into service level agreements, targets and budgets, etc. Second, sentencers. Further, at this point we need to make a distinction between probation areas and the NPD.
Ministers and civil servants
The probation service does not operate within a true market. It is part of the criminal justice system over which Home Office ministers and civil servants, of which the NPD is a part, seek to exercise some command. They model the system, estimate aggregate case-flows, determine priorities and allocate budgets. They have a key role in designing, delivering and marketing the product range, which is ostensibly designed to deliver an end product, or outcome, of reduced offending and/or improved public protection. But the government's command is imperfect and contingent. The level of crime, and public reactions to it, is uncertain. Further, though parliament determines the criminal law and the powers available to sentencers, the latter, by custom, have a wide discretion, the independent exercise of which is jealously guarded. It follows that there is a quasi-market in sentencing options, a quasi-market, which successive governments have, since the 1980s, encouraged for political reasons and through the importation of commercial language and devices -privatization, contracting out, incentivized decision-making, etc -public servants to think of in market terms. Thus the talk of customers, products, and so on. As far as probation areas are concerned, sentencers are their core users or customers, or they should be so regarded.
Sentencers
The principal mechanisms through which the probation service makes known and offers its services to sentencers hardly need to be spelt out. The courts and the parole board require the probation service to prepare reports on offenders about to be sentenced or subject to discretionary release. The probation service undertakes risk-need assessments and recommends appropriate disposals. By these means the service in effect sets out its stall. It offers different interventions. It suggests that these interventions will meet different groups of offenders' risks and needs. Sentencers dispose in the light, among other things, of these probation diagnoses, prognoses, and recommendations in the context of their appreciation (knowledge, understanding, trust and belief) of the available penal product range.
Like suppliers, or producers, in any commercial market place, the probation service, steered by its Home Office budget-holder, seeks to condition sentencer opinion. New sentencing options are introduced, or withdrawn, by statute. New programmes are made available within sentencing options. These options and programmes are branded in the sense that the marketing of these different products is more or less backed up with evidence regarding their efficacy and, just as importantly, penal-philosophical appearances suggesting their suitability and tariff applicability for different groups of offenders.
But the message should be clear. In the absence of mandatory sentencing, the Home Office-encouraged planning, budgeting, product development and marketing strategy counts for little if sentencers ultimately do not use them. If they exercise their discretion not to employ sentences and programmes which the Home Office targets say should be delivered by the probation service then it is pretty clear what the long-term consequence will be for the probation budget. How then can local probation managers be under any doubt about who their principal customers are?
Cultural and organization issues
There are several reasons why probation managers may judge Home Office ministers to be their core customers. First, it is the command aspect of the probation economy which most bears down on them. The Home Office-NPD set the supply targets, many of which, in the short term, either fall short of what it is anticipated, or hoped, the sentencer quasi-market will demand, or which stipulate standards which it is hoped will condition sentencer opinion and generate increased demand. The delivery of drug treatment and testing orders is an example of the first; improved enforcement standards an example of the second. These are the cash-linked imperatives which dominate local managers. Second, probation managers mistrust that resources will follow any increased demand and supply of their services to sentencers: mistrust because they know, from bitter experience, that they do not operate in a true market. Were they to get sentencers proportionately to increase the use of the community sentences they deliver, there is no guarantee that their resources would increase. Their experience during the early to mid 1990s when Michael Howard was Home Secretary taught them that: the probation service budget was cut severely and probation caseloads increased significantly. Even if we discount the anachronistic data still published annually in the Probation Statistics -which relate offender caseloads to probation officers, who now comprise only about half of all probation service staff -a broader estimation suggests that service caseloads increased between 1990 and 2000 by about 30 per cent.
As for probation managers identifying offenders or the public at large as their 'core customers', this is arguably commendable testimony to their public service commitment -their resistance to inappropriate commercial market tomfooleryand the fact that in recent years they have been drilled in the language of stakeholding. Further, meeting offenders' needs, insofar as that increases offender motivation and compliance, contributes to sentencer confidence which, in the long run, is likely to stimulate sentencers to make increased use of probation services. Moreover, increased general public knowledge about and confidence in the probation service may persuade sentencers, the majority of whom -lay magistrates -see themselves as acting on behalf of the public at large, to make greater use of probation services. And if victims were said generally to favour probation interventions that might plausibly have the same consequence. If all that be the case, does it really matter if probation managers do not focus on sentencers as their target users?
I think it does matter. It matters because the links in this posited chain of satisfaction are weak. The level of public confidence in the probation service is very unlikely to greatly change for the reasons I have stressed -the public neither deals with the probation service or thinks about it. As for offenders' and victims' reactions, most sentencers (in which I include members of the parole board) are unlikely to know what they are unless the probation service informs them. This is why sentencers are the probation service's core users and why, I suggest, that fact needs to be driven home by the creation of a more effective quasi-market than we have at present.
One last word on why we should dispense with the language of customers. Although we are nowadays attuned to the fact that in developed consumerist market economies, producers create the demand for their product -condition their customers -the orthodox doctrine is nevertheless that customers are always right and must be given what they want. That cannot and should not be the basis on which we build criminal justice. Justice is too precious and complex a matter to be grounded on crude populism. Further, the relationship between sentencers and probation staff is ideally one between professionals -with different roles, but each exercising professional judgement grounded on expertise, exchanged on the basis of trust. Sound relationships based on those values have to be earned and nurtured.
What do sentencers want from the probation service?
Since little recent work has been done on the attitudes and reasoning of sentencers in England and Wales, we have to concentrate most of our attention on the sentencing options which in recent years sentencers have taken up. Table 1 summarizes the data for the last decade. The overall pattern is clear. The number of offenders sentenced in 1990 and 2000 remained almost constant, but whereas the proportionate use of discharges held steady (at least for males), use of the fine and suspended custody fell substantially, while resort to both community penalties and immediate custody increased significantly. The total proportionate use of custody almost doubled while that of community penalties increased by approximately one half (from 15 to 24 per cent for males and 21 to 33 per cent for females).
The data can be cut in different ways -magistrates' courts compared to the crown court, males and females, different age groups. There are important variations, but as Table 2 demonstrates, the direction of the trend is in each case the same.
Sentences have become substantially more severe, community penalties displacing financial penalties (and to a lesser extent discharges) and immediate custody displacing community penalties and suspended sentences. Furthermore, the custodial sentences being imposed are longer: though the average sentences imposed in magistrates courts have remained more or less constant at 2.6 months, those imposed in the crown court increased from 20.5 to 24.2 months between 1990 and 2000 (Home Office, 2001a, Table 7 .15).
Faced with these data many people would I think hypothesize that the trend reflects more serious offending or that the offences now being sentenced are committed by offenders with more serious prior records. This is possibly part of the explanation, but the evidence clearly shows that sentencing has become more punitive and interventionist. The proportion of sentenced prison receptions convicted of crimes of violence (including sexual offences and robbery) is, at 21 per cent, less than it was ten years ago and the limited data available do not show prisoners to be more recidivist, though because prison sentences are longer, and long-term prisoners now spend a higher proportion of their sentences in custody than previously, the population in prison at any one time (the daily average population) has now a more serious offending record (Home Office, 2001b, Table 4 .2; see also discussion in Morgan, 2002) .
The same picture emerges from an analysis of the offenders supervised by the probation service. They are clearly less serious in type. In 1990, 26 per cent of probationers (those on community rehabilitation orders today) had violence against the person, a sexual offence, burglary or robbery as their principal current offence and slightly more, 28 per cent, were convicted of a summary offence; by 2000 the equivalent figures were 16 and 36 per cent (Home Office, 2002, Table  3 .5). Community service (now community punishment) offenders display a similar pattern. In 2000, 18 per cent had been convicted for violence, sex, burglary or robbery compared to 28 per cent in 1990 and no fewer than two fifths (40 per cent) are now convicted of summary offences compared to one third (31 per cent) ten years ago (ibid). The proportion of community punishment and rehabilitation order offenders convicted of summary offences is, at 43 per cent, even higher today than ten years ago (30 per cent -ibid). Nor is it the case that these less serious probation-supervised current offenders have a more serious offending history. As Table 3 demonstrates, the proportion of offenders subject to all types of community penalties who have previously experienced imprisonment has fallen significantly in the last ten years (ibid, Table 3.7) and those with no previous convictions has substantially increased.
Yet despite this pattern of less serious offending, the proportion of supervised offenders subject to at least one additional requirement, most commonly to participate in specified activities, has risen from from 24 to 33 per cent (ibid, Table 3.12). Not surprisingly the proportion whose CROs are terminated early by reason of a further conviction has fallen (down from 16 to 12 per cent between 1990 and 2000) whereas the proportion terminated for failure to comply with the terms of their order has risen (up from 3 to 7 per cent -ibid, Table 4 .4).
The picture that emerges, therefore, is that more and more offenders are getting mired deeper and deeper within the criminal justice system for doing less and less. The evidence is that since 1993 crime has fallen significantly, albeit the rate remains twice what it was as recently as 1980. Yet at over 72,000 (as at September 2002) the prison population stands at a record high and the probation service has caseloads, as we have seen, 30 per cent higher today than ten years ago, caseloads that are increasingly silted up with less serious offenders. This is not the place to consider some of the structural forces which lie behind these sentencing trends -the apparently relentless rise in recorded and unrecorded crime until the mid-1990s (Kershaw et al., 2001 , Chapter 3); growth in public anxiety about crime, albeit a concern that has declined somewhat from the peak levels recorded in the mid-1990s (ibid, Chapter 5); the feelings of general insecurity which are said to characterize our post-modern, globalized world; the party politicization of 'law and order' and the spectacle during the 1980s and early 1990s of competing politicians seeking to out-bid each other in toughness (Downes & Morgan, 2002) ; the development of 'What Works' penal policy and the revitalization of rehabilitative thinking that we can 'make people better' (Raynor & Vanstone, 2002) ; and so on. What is clear, however, is that the probation service has itself played a part. Though a significant proportion of offenders sentenced to prison are committed without benefit of a pre-sentence report (the recent HMI Probation/HMI Prisons 2001 review of resettlement found it to be 17 per cent), the same is not true of offenders made subject to community penalties. Further, though probation managers tend to argue that a significant proportion of the 42 per cent greater number of court reports requested by the magistrates' courts during 1990-2000 (Home Office, 2002, Table 2 .1) are arguably unnecessary, a declining proportion of the proposals made in those court reports are for fines or discharges. From data available to me from the Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate, from HMIP's inspection reports and from research officers employed in some probation areas, the following picture emerges. Though the figures vary from one probation area (and prior to April 2001, probation service) to another, it appears that proposals for custody have doubled from 2-3 to 5-6 per cent and proposals for fines or discharges have declined from 10-12 to 5-6 per cent. The overwhelming majority of PSRs in which a clear proposal is made -and a large proportion of PSRs without proposals result in custodial sentences, which suggests that the absence of a proposal is often tacit recognition of that outcome -are for community sentences. Which is to say that probation officers are encouraging the increasingly interventionist trend of sentencing. This should cause no surprise. Probation officers have for several years been encouraged to make realistic proposals and high concordance rates have come to be regarded as desirable. Thus to the extent that sentencers have moved up-tariff, so also have probation officers.
The silting up of the higher probation caseloads with less serious offenders is best illustrated with data emerging from the pilot application of OASys, the probation and prison service's new joint offender assessment tool.
Offenders with scores under 30 are below the threshold at which it is considered appropriate that they be allocated to an accredited offending behaviour programme, first because they do not need it, and second because the evidence suggests that their participation may increase rather than reduce the likelihood that they will reoffend. What is striking about the data in Table 4 is that two thirds of all offenders subject to community punishment orders fall into this category, a finding consistent with the figures in Table 3 : almost half of all offenders doing community service have no previous convictions. The proportion of offenders with low likelihood of reoffending on community punishment orders is striking both because it is higher than that for assessed offenders subsequently fined or given conditional discharges and because the probation service hopes shortly to introduce an enhanced accredited programme of community service.
Shaping future demand for probation services
What conclusions are we to draw from the trend data? I suggest the following:
The last decade has witnessed the introduction of an increasing array of community penalties -the combination order, the curfew order with electronic monitoring, the drug treatment and testing order (DTTO), the exclusion order and the drug abstinence order. A separate set of new orders has been introduced for juveniles. England and Wales now has the largest range of sentencing options of any jurisdiction in Western Europe. Further, the language of community penalties has been toughened. The probation order has become the community rehabilitation order and community service orders have become community punishment orders. Combination orders are now community punishment and rehabilitation orders.
Yet custody has not been displaced. On the contrary, the changes have fuelled an increasingly interventionist and punitive sentencing trend resulting in a record prison population and a probation service overburdened with low risk offenders to supervise. It has been a classic example, to use Stan Cohen's (1985) terminology, of net widening.
We should ask searching questions, therefore, of any further proposals to introduce new sentences, or additional conditions attached to existing sentences, particularly if they involve tougher, more intensive supervision or surveillance. Such proposals are likely to be accompanied by arguments, as they have been in the past, that the tougher orders or requirements are necessary for community penalties to be credible to sentencers: by that means alone will sentencers be willing to substitute punishment in the community for custody. This road has repeatedly been travelled before. Unless such proposals are accompanied by fundamental means to displace those low risk offenders currently subject to community penalties, the outcome is likely to be further ratcheting up of the punitive trend. What then must be done? First, the National Probation Service (NPS), both nationally and at area level, must develop more effective means to inform the judiciary (both magistrates and judges) about the day-to-day reality of community penalties -how demanding they are for the offenders involved, what criminogenic issues are addressed and by what means, and what impact they have for offenders both individually and generally -and by so doing persuade them this work is best done if caseloads are not cluttered up with low risk offenders. Between them probation areas already employ a variety of methods ranging from explanatory leaflets attached to presentence reports, to presentations to benches. Frequent references are made to the loss, with the creation of the NPS, of probation liaison committees. But the latter only ever reached the minority of magistrates who attended them and they seldom included stipendiary magistrates (now district judges). Moreover they failed, as we have seen, to stem the punitive tide. It follows that the NPS needs to develop more imaginative methods for reaching sentencers generally and getting across the many positive messages the service has to tell. One lesson, anticipated by the Halliday Report (Home Office, 2001c, paras 5.18-19) is available from the early experience derived from DTTOs which involves periodic reviews of offenders' progress. The evidence from the operation of DTTOs, as the recent White Paper implied (CJS 2002, para 4.46) , is that sentencers relish being involved in the implementation of sentences and are much more tolerant of the difficulties involved in changing behaviour than might have been imagined. DTTOs are also striking because the offenders subject to them are typically high risk. Implementing the Halliday recommendations will be expensive, but more work could be done on informing sentencers about the personal progress of the offenders they sentence.
Second, there is an urgent need to resuscitate the use of financial penalties, the decline in the take up of which has, as we have seen, been little short of catastrophic during the 1990s. A high proportion of the offenders currently being made subject to community penalties, particularly community punishment orders, would have been fined ten years ago. There are problems collecting fines (see Elliott et al., 1999) and it is facile, therefore, to regard financial penalties as a source of revenue in comparison to the costs of other disposals. Nevertheless the use of fines involves substantially less cost (and may even generate net income) compared to other penalties and the historical evidence is that they are no less effective in reducing re-offending. Moreover it is untenable to suggest that at a time when unemployment is at an historic low point, most offenders cannot afford to pay something. There is a strong case for considering the reintroduction of day fines, so precipitously and unwisely abandoned in 1992, and the principle underlying which many benches retained (see Charman et al., 1996) . Third, the scope for making restorative justice -a meeting between the offender and his or her victim with a view to exploring some form of restitution -an option both pre-and post-sentence should actively be explored. The jury remains out as to the benefits for both victims and reoffending and many questions remain for procedural and substantive justice of employing the restorative justice approach (see Zedner, 2002) . But the evidence on outcomes is positive with regard to certain categories of offences and offenders.
Fourth, community service must be moved up-tariff, where it used to be. On the basis of the pilot OASys data reviewed in Table 4 , it would appear that upwards of 20,000 offenders sentenced each year to community punishment orders do not require the enhanced accredited form of community service which the NPS plans shortly to introduce. They might be fined instead. On the same basis an estimated 8500 offenders sentenced each year to community rehabilitation orders or community punishment and rehabilitation orders should not be targeted for accredited offending behaviour programmes. Many of them might be fined instead, reserving these more interventionist, and costly, programmes for higher risk groups.
Fifth, if it is argued that these low risk offenders cannot, on whatever grounds (proportionality, personal financial circumstances, etc.) be fined or given discharges, then consideration might be given to introducing less intensive, or less professional, supervision or surveillance for some categories of offenders, possibly contracted out. Stand-alone electronic monitoring orders are a clear option.
None of these five options is mutually exclusive. But they need to be pursued through a joint debate between the probation service and sentencers. Why? Because in the same way that the prison service cannot pursue sensible crime reduction initiatives due to overcrowding and the imperatives of estate and population management, so also the probation service is increasingly overburdened with low risk offenders whose supervision requirements absorb scarce resources which are needed elsewhere to address the supervision and surveillance needs of medium and high risk offenders. Something has to give. If crime reduction is to be achieved and the public better protected, the probation service must proactively, with government and sentencers, better determine the use to which its scarce resources are put.
